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The Limits of judicial Power: The Supreme Court in Ameri9an Politics. By William 
Lasser. (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1988. Pp. 
354. Index. $32.95.) 
This book discusses the power and vulnerability of the Supreme Court by 
examining it in periods of crisis. Professor Lasser concludes that the Court's power 
to resolve these political crises was limited but that its institutional position was 
never in serious danger. He argues further that the resolution of those crises makes 
it unlikely that a similar political crisis will arise again, and this makes the Court 
more powerful and active on controversial issues today. 
More than half the book is devoted to three major crises in the Supreme Court's 
existence-the Dred Scott case, the Reconstruction era, and the New Deal court. 
Within the limits imposed by space, these sections provide a splendid overview of 
the legal issues before the Court and the political reaction to its decisions. Lasser 
makes both the politics and the law clear. 
Those three crises reveal the Court under its greatest stress. Critics attacked the 
Court for obstructing necessary federal laws and succeeded in reversing or limiting 
the effect of the decisions which were the focus of their attack. These were periods 
of national debate over fundamental political principles quite unlike the usual 
broad consensus that typifies American political debate. Lasser writes that during 
such periods of "critical realignment," the Court is least capable of playing an 
effective role. 
Although the Court could not control the outcome of these political cataclysms 
and was vilified for attempting to do so, Lasser claims that the Court itself was never 
in danger. His analysis of Dred Scott and Reconstruction politics relies heavily on 
Stanley Kutler'sjudicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968). Kutler's revisionist view attacked the conventional wisdom 
that the Court's political vulnerability during the Reconstruction era made it a timid, 
weak institution. Kutler argued that the advantages of the Court's institutional role 
always outweighed the negative reaction to particular decisions. Thus, critics 
attacked the decisions of the Court, but not the Court itself. 
Lasser expands Kutler 's thesis to the New Deal and into the modem era. He adds 
a new dimension of political theory to explain the past and to suggest a significant 
shift in the modern era. Lasser argues that the groups most critical of the Court's 
decision needed to preserve the Court's traditional role in judicial review. "The 
policies advocated by Lincoln, the radical Republicans and Roosevelt required a 
strong national government and depended on a broad interpretation of the federal 
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government's powers under the Constitution" (p. 258). Only the Court could 
legitimate such powers, so it was important to capture the Court as an ally and not 
to destroy it. 
The survival of the Court as an institution results, at least in part, from its inability 
to maintain its decisions in the face of sustained and overwhelming popular 
opposition. When that opposition prevails, usually through new appointments to 
the Court, its very success becomes a reason to support the Court. Lasser suggests 
that the futility of any attempt by the Court to resolve Jolitic~l crises during periods 
of critical realignment makes the effort unwise. Thus, Dred Scott made the Court a 
target of Republican scorn as a tool of the "slave power." If the Court finds itself 
unwittingly caught in the middle of a political crossfire during a period of critical 
realignment, Lasser urges retreat. For example, in Ex parte Milligan, the Court held 
that military courts cannot convict a civilian where the civil courts are open and 
functioning. The decision was relatively uncontroversial when it was announced 
but became the center of a storm of controversy by the time it was published because 
intervening political events placed the scope of military power at the center of 
Reconstruction policy. The Court then acted cautiously to extricate itself Ex parte 
McCardle raised a challenge to part ofthe Congressional Reconstruction program. 
Chief Justice Salmon P Chase delayed decision until Congress passed legislation 
depriving the Court of jurisdiction. Chase then held that the Court had no jurisdic-
tion to decide the case which had already been argued before it, a decision Lasser 
praises as "an act of great vision and statesmanship" (p. 253). 
Lasser reconciles his praise for Chase's discretion with his view that commen-
tators have overestimated the vulnerability of the Court by arguing that periods of 
"critical realignment" are rare and that they are unlikely to arise in the future. He 
states that the power of the modern Court is deceptive because it has distanced 
itself from those issues capable of creating full-scale crises which would reveal the 
limits of its political strength. According to Lasser, the resolution of the slavery issue 
after the Civil War meant that fundamental divisions in American politics centered 
on economic policy. This was settled by the New Deal. Thus, Lasser says that "the 
Court's role in policing the broad contours of federal policy has decreased almost 
to the vanishing point" (p. 264). 
Lasser examines the decisions of the modem era which have provoked political 
responses--decisions on segregation, free speech, reapportionment, school prayer, 
criminal procedure, busing remedies, and abortion. He even discusses the debate 
on judicial review between then Attorney General Edwin Meese and Justice William 
Brennan as well as the rejection of the nomination of Judge Robert Bark to the 
Supreme Court. This discussion of the modem era compresses a great deal, and 
some statements need further explanation. Lasser refers to Reed v. Reed, for 
example, as "a landmark decision calling for heightened scrutiny of laws that 
discriminate against women" (p. 209). Although heightened scrutiny of gender 
distinctions may have been implicit in its decision, the Court did not acknowledge 
there that it was doing anything new. Lasser also blunders by citing Justice Byron 
White's dissent in Miranda for the proposition that the Court should not make new 
